Democratic Deconsolidation

Monomoy Regional High School

Democratic Deconsolidation and the Cold War

Shannen Holbrook

Global Studies Capstone

Mr. Dickson

Introduction

The Cold War is the most important ideological war in recent American history; in which Western capitalism was pitted against Soviet communism. This decades-long cold war serves as an important guide for how America and the rest of the world should handle ideological wars in the future.

Recent decades have seen democratic backsliding in formerly semi-liberal democracies. These countries have moved away from traditional liberal democracies, and towards authoritarianism, through the consolidation of power in the executive and the delegitimization of critical institutions such as the press and the judiciary.

Democratic deconsolidation is measured by citizens’ support for democracy, the power of anti-democratic parties, and the acceptance of laws and norms. Currently, we are witnessing democratic deconsolidation in a handful of countries, including key United States ally Turkey and European Union member Hungary. 

In Hungary, Prime Minister Viktor Orban and the Fidesz party have systematically pushed the country towards authoritarianism by undermining the judiciary and consolidating power under Orban. Turkey is also backsliding in a similar way, with President Erdogan consolidating his power and undermining the legitimacy of the free press.

 Although these countries’ moves towards authoritarianism are worrisome, this does not precipitate the assumption that all democracies are on the path to deconsolidation. Even as we see similar issues occurring in the American political system, such as the undermining of public support for the free press and increased nationalism; the marked differences in the structures and stability between semi-liberal democracies like Hungary and Turkey, and true liberal democracies are what makes this trend less of a threat for other democracies. In the United States, for example, the structure of the legislative branch makes it almost impossible for any party to pass constitutional amendments without bipartisan support. In newer democracies, however, protections from authoritarianism may be more easily overcome.

Although deconsolidation may not be occurring in the United States or the United Kingdom, this trend towards authoritarianism presents an ideological threat to liberal democracies. As these countries turn away from democracy, and towards facism and strong-men rulers; it is the responsibility of both liberal democracies (such as the United States and the United Kingdom) and international institutions (such as the United Nations and the European Union) to prevent these countries from moving further away from democracy, and consider how best to prevent the further spread of authoritarianism.

Comparable to the Cold War, the rise of democratic deconsolidation can be seen as a similar ideological cold war between democracy and authoritarianism. The difference between now and then, however, is that this war is not being fought with nuclear weapons and proxy wars, but is being fought with sanctions and public opinion.

However, despite these differences, the strategies for combating democratic deconsolidation are similar. In looking back at the mistakes and successes of the United State’s strategies for preventing the spread of communism during the Cold War, liberal democracies can ascertain the best strategy for dealing with the threat of democratic deconsolidation.

Democratic Deconsolidation

Democratic deconsolidation can be defined as a slow decline in the quality of democracy within a country; as politicians erode the foundations of democracy and push a country towards becoming an authoritarian state. During the Cold War, deconsolidation could be seen in obvious examples such as coups, but since then deconsolidation has become more subtle (Bermeo).

One way of measuring deconsolidation is by using the World Values Survey as a way of calculating public approval for democracy (Foa and Mounk). By looking at respondents answers to the question “How essential is living in a democracy?” one can reasonably ascertain the importance of democracy to the citizens of a country. In the 2006-2009 survey the percent of respondents who gave an answer of 10 to this question was 49.9% for the United States, 50.3% for Hungary, and 53.6% for the United Kingdom. This appears to be a worrisome sign for all democracies, not just the ones we have witnessed real democratic deconsolidation in. However, if we consider all high valued answers (eight and above), these percentages change to 73.4% for the United States, 77.3% for Hungary, and 76% for the United Kingdom. 

If support for democracy can supposedly help to predict deconsolidation, then why did Hungary have a higher percentage of citizens who believe that democracy was of absolute importance? When examining this over time we see that in Hungary, democracy has had relatively the same amount of support since the 1990s, while the United States’s support for democracy has been slowly declining. Public opinion of democracy has been falling in the United States, but rising or remaining the same in countries, like Hungary, who have taken a turn away from liberal democracy. 

The missing factor that differentiates consolidated democracies like the United Kingdom and the United States from illiberal democracies like Hungary, is the level of support for anti-democratic parties. In the United States and the United Kingdom, although there has been a recent increase in support for alternatives to democracy, democracy is by far the more popular option. In Hungary, however, we see that support for alternatives such as having “experts make decisions” is equal, or almost equal, to the support for democracy. 

Democratic deconsolidation isn’t occurring in nearly as many places as it would seem at first, and although trends in the popularity of democracy are decreasing in some countries, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, the more important trend is the support for anti-democratic alternatives which are not increasing at a fast pace in consolidated democracies. 

In addition to this, both the United States and the United Kingdom have safeguards in place which prevent executives from consolidating power. In the United States, the system of checks and balances prevents any one branch from significantly overstepping their power without being stopped.

Newer democracies and democracies with significant political turmoil may have less support for institutions, which is why they experience democratic deconsolidation at a higher and faster rate than older democracies.

Deconsolidation in Hungary

An important divide between populist parties in Eastern and Western European countries is who they define as the opposition. This difference helps to explain why semi-anti-democratic-populist parties in the United Kingdom are not as dangerous to the survival of democracy as parties like the Fidesz Party in Hungary (Skolkay). 

While populists in all of Europe recognize the “corrupt political elite” as the enemy of the people, who they define these elites as varies between East and West Europe and even country to country. Generally, in Eastern Europe, the elites that populists are in opposition to are communists. The Fidesz Party in Hungary has frequently vilified members of the judiciary and police by claiming they represent the old communist order. In Western Europe, these elites are seen as party insiders and career politicians. Even in the case of Spain, where their main populist party is left-wing, they use the government “insiders” as a way to use people’s dissatisfaction with the government to gain power (Rodríguez-Teruel, Barrio, & Barberà, 2016).

In Hungary, the aim of the populist party is to create an “illiberal democracy” (Rupnik, 2016). These countries, in Eastern Europe, do not have a long history of liberal democracy and populist leaders therewant their democracies to be significantly more authoritarian than democratic. They do not see democracy as a useful way of governing and getting things done, but instead see it as a hindrance to their goals. 

Trying to turn the United Kingdom into a competitive authoritarian state is not the purpose of the populist party UKIP (UK Independence Party). Although they may use populist tactics and some authoritarian language to win over supporters, they aren’t calling for the overthrow of liberal democracy as a whole; whereas the Fidesz party in Hungary is.

Both left and right-wing populists in Europe are often opposed to the European Union in part or as a whole. In Hungary this is seen by the demonization of the European Union by the Fidesz Party. There is a shared Euroscepticism in many populist parties across Europe, which often use the EU as an antagonist in order to fear-monger and persuade citizens to vote for more nationalist candidates (Ford & Goodwin, 2017). 

The Fidesz party in Hungary came to power due to the migrant crisis in the 2000s, and did so in a similar fashion to many other populist parties. The effective use of populism as a campaign strategy and party platform in Hungary makes the at times extreme views of Victor Orban and his party more appealing to the average voter.

By demonizing the European Union by using citizens’ fears of communism, Victor Orban and the Fidesz party were able to seize control of the Hungarian government. Then, by appealing to voters’ sense of nationalism and capitalizing on xenophobia, the Fidesz party began to slowly move the country away from liberal democracy and towards authoritarianism. Hungary represents a worrying example of how countries deconsolidate without intervention.

Deconsolidation in Turkey

Authoritarians gained power in Turkey through different strategies than in Hungary. In Hungary, the Fidesz party appealed to voters’ sense of nationalism, as well as their dislike for communism. In Turkey, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) appealed to voters through national as well as religious identity. Turkey is a majority muslim country, which has been an extremely secular state since Kemal Atatürk became the country’s first president in 1923. Since then, there has been a concerted effort by religious groups and parties (currently the AKP) to move Turkey away from secularism and return it to its religious roots of the Ottoman Empire. 

With a military coup attempt in 2016, and the growing power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), Turkey has been moving from a secular semi-democracy, to a religious modern authoritarian state (Ergun Özbudun, 2014). This has left many of Turkey’s democratic allies (like the United States) wondering what to do.

The move towards authoritarianism has been spurred on by the far right Justice and Development Party (AKP) and their leader, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The AKP in Turkey is a conservative nationalist party, which came to power on a wave of anti-secular and conservative momentum. The AKP’s ideological platform is based upon their religious identity as muslims, and upon the “lost” legacy of the Ottoman empire. The AKP represents a coalition of formerly different voters in Turkey. This allowed them to come to power because of their broad appeal to a large majority of right-wing conservative voters; far-right nationalists, moderate religious conservatives, as well as hard-line Islamists. 

The AKP’s asstounding popularity among religious and nationalist conservatives within Turkey has allowed them to weaken secular laws in the country. The party, because it is constitutionally banned from advocating for Islamism, has been covertly weakening these secular laws and institutions within the country; such as when they imposed higher taxes on alcohol and began regulating it more strictly. 

Alcohol had previously been taxed at a normal rate, and regulated similarly to countries in Europe due to Turkey’s policy of stringent secularism. However, because alcohol is prohibited in Islam, the AKP implemented high taxes and regulations so their policies would not be blatantly non-secular.

After winning the presidency for a second time in 2018, Erdogan’s party also won the majority of seats in parliament. Videos of ballot-stuffing were also recorded and anomalies in the votes were found. These developments have led to allegations of the governmental vote rigging (Aydogan, 2018). This, along with the AKP’s purging of the judiciary and constitutional reforms that give Erdogan more power, are causing people to rethink calling Turkey a democracy. 

In 2017 the AKP party passed a series of eighteen constitutional amendments through parliament which moved the country towards authoritarianism by removing the office of Prime Minister, disallowing most Members of Parliament from proposing changes to the President’s budget, and increasing the President’s role in appointing judges. These amendments were then approved by referendum in which 51%  to 48%.

These amendments were a strong step towards authoritarianism for Turkey. They greatly expanded the role of the President; first by removing the office of Prime Minister entirely, then by making it extremely unlikely that any budget he proposes will be changed by parliament, and finally by allowing him to exercise greater control over the country’s courts.

These amendments remove key checks on Presidential power. By removing the Prime Minister, President Erdogan is now both the head of the executive branch and the head of the government, giving him power over the legislature. Preventing the majority of members of parliament from proposing amendments to the President’s budget, also reduces the legislature’s power to make decisions other than ones in support of President Erdogan. Finally, by allowing the President to appoint a greater proportion of the country’s high court judges; the possibility of real and legitimate judicial review of his actions is diminished.

Yet, despite this clear move towards authoritarianism, Turkey is still in talks to become a member state of the European Union. This is because of Turkey’s strategic location. Turkey is important for national security reasons as well as for the fact that it took in a large amount of refugees who would have otherwise gone to European countries. Turkey also wants to join the EU, not only because their continued non-admittance gives Erdogan propaganda material, but because the EU would offer legitimacy to the AKP’s government as being a real democracy. The EU has frozen these talks, in an attempt to pressure Erdogan to not implement or to reverse these constitutional reforms (Kreppel & Ciddi, 2017). The EU’s refusal to formally end talks, while also not fully considering Turkey as a possible member state, shows the need for a unified strategy by international actors to deal with the rise of authoritarianism in Turkey. 

Rollback

Rollback was one of the most controversial strategies of preventing the spread of communism during the Cold War. It involved “rolling back” communism, usually via attempted assassinations, military intervention, or CIA sponsored coups, which installed United States backed governments in order to prevent Soviet influence (Richards).

The most notable example of rollback occurred in 1953, when a CIA backed revolution overthrew democratically elected Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh. The United States considered Mosaddegh a threat because of his leftist policies and nationalization of Iranian Oil. Mosaddegh’s successor was Shah Pahlavi, a pro-American monarch.

The United States also pursued the policy of rollback when they orchestrated the overthrow of the democratic president of Guatemala in the 1950s. When President Jacobo Arbenz implemented policies redistributing land to the extremely impoverished, the CIA believed that Guatemala was “on the verge of communism”. This CIA coup resulted in a decades long civil war within Guatemala with a series of military dictators seizing power.

It’s clear, just by looking at these two examples, that rollback is not a viable long term solution to democratic deconsolidation (Richards).

In addition to the long-term inviability of this strategy; rollback is also a violation of Article Two, Section Four of the United Nations Charter which states; “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”. Sponsoring a coup in a foreign country, or even attempting to sew chaos and discontent within other sovereign nations, is a violation of this section of the United Nations charter. 

Rollback would not only be a violation of the United States’ commitment to the United Nations, but it would also most likely result in an even more authoritative leader in these countries. 

When the United States removed Prime Minister Mosaddegh in Iran, they installed Shah Pahlavi. Although the Shah was supportive of the United States and their oil interests in Iran, he was also a brutal dictator. A dictator so bad, in fact, that in 1979 the people of Iran overthrew him and put in place the current anti-western government they have today.

The strategy of rollback has very few (if any) benefits for anyone involved. The people of the country whose government has been “rolled back” often suffer from human rights abuses and military conflict, and the country doesn’t end up with a stable democracy, or any democracy at all.

Containment

Containment was another main strategy that the United States employed in combating communism during the Cold War. The main premise of containment was that by stopping communism (or any other political ideology) from spreading to other countries, then it would eventually “die out”.

Containment was first implemented by the Truman administration, and remained part of every administration’s strategy until the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union. Although each administration’s version of containment was different, generally it consisted of; not engaging in trade or diplomacy with the USSR and threatening military action if the Soviets attempted to expand anymore (“Containment”).

Although popular throughout the entirety of the Cold War, this strategy would not be viable in response to democratic deconsolidation. In cutting off countries diplomatically and economically, we run the risk of creating a state which is entirely dependent on another non-democratic country. This is seen with North Korea; which the United States and European Union cut off completely, leading to them becoming economically dependent on China: a communist authoritarian state. 

Containment has more advantages than rollback, however. The most notable of which being that if the country which has been “contained” does not find an ally in another nondemocratic nation; the regime can become unstable and collapse. However, this is ethically and morally wrong because it would lead to an economic and humanitarian crisis. 

In addition to the ethical dilemma with containment, it is extremely difficult to completely cut off a country. Looking at Turkey, in specific, it is a key strategic ally for the United States in the Middle East. Without their support for our military action in countries like Iraq and Syria, we would be at an extreme disadvantage and see an escalation in the conflict if they withdrew their support for our operations. 

Containment, although appealing in theory, is an unworkable strategy for dealing with deconsolidation. There would be little political support for it and, like rollback, there would be extreme risks and consequences which would outweigh any possible benefit that could come of it (and it’s unlikely there would be any benefits from a regime collapse).

Essentially, containment can be thought of as a “lite” version of rollback. It comes with the same consequences of regime instability and collapse, the possibility of a humanitarian crisis, and an escalation of tensions. The only key difference is that it does not involve military action against a sovereign nation (covert or otherwise). 

Detente

Detente was the last of the major Cold War strategies. This strategy was mainly based upon the easing of tensions between the United States and the USSR. The Nixon administration utilized soft power in the form of diplomacy, in order to ease tensions between the two countries. 

Detente would be the obvious best choice for combatting deconsolidation. If the United States and other liberal democracies utilize their diplomats in order to pressure semi-authoritarian states into complying with UN law and respecting human rights; there is a better chance of them actually moving towards democracy (Hughes).

Public pressure and loud public statements decrying would-be dictators will always backfire. It serves as propaganda for populists who seek to consolidate their power and undermine their democracy. Imposing tariffs and sanctions has the same effect because by hurting the people of a country, they turn against the country antagonizing them, not their own elected officials.

By keeping the channels of diplomacy open to countries moving towards authoritarianism, and showing them the benefits of alliances and trade with the United States and Europe; we can more effectively exercise control over them, and therefore keep them from moving any further away from democracy.

Diplomacy and compromise are not the most popular political strategy, as we saw in the Cold War, but it is impossible to win an ideological war through violence or isolationism (Office of the Historian). By using negotiation instead of force, the United States European Union will be able to win over the citizens of these countries instead of turning them against them; and hopefully influence them to pressure their own elected officials for democratic reforms. 

Convincing semi-authoritarian leaders that they will be better off as democracies than authoritarian states is not an easy path to winning defeating democratic deconsolidation. But, it is a far better and more effective option than rollback or containment.

Conclusion

It is clear through examining the United States’ cold war strategies; that if the United States and European Union are serious about combatting democratic deconsolidation abroad, the only effective strategy is detente. 

Rollback is an incredibly risky policy with little to no gain for any country involved; it is a direct violation of the United Nations charter and often leads to even worse regimes taking the place of the government that was “rolled back”. 

Containment is a more viable strategy than rollback, but it has its own inherent risks. It has the possibility of creating a self-sufficient authoritarian state and losing a key military or trade ally in the process.

In order to curtail the spread of democratic deconsolidation abroad, liberal democracies must engage in an easing of tensions and an increase of diplomatic contact with these countries. Soft power, in the form of diplomacy and beneficial trade agreements, are the key to pushing countries towards liberal democracy.

By using the carrot of better trade, instead of the stick of military action or sanctions, countries can more effectively coerce illiberal democracies into complying. Better relations between countries gives politicians in countries which are deconsolidating a political “win”, as opposed to the “loss” sanctions would be. 

Detente strives to convince leaders of deconsolidating states that it is more beneficial for them to turn back to democracy than to continue towards authoritarianism. It also seeks to convince the people within those countries of the need for democracy, making them push for democratic reforms (via peaceful protest) rather than have a foreign nation force a regime change upon them.

If liberal democracies are truly serious about stopping democratic deconsolidation, they must recognize that the only way this can be achieved is through strategic and targeted diplomatic action. A unified strategy between liberal democratic nations is the only way to prevent countries like Hungary and Turkey from becoming true authoritarian states.

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